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Towards a comprehensive understanding of the processes underlying phenomenological continuity.

Davis OM, Tippett LJ, Addis DR

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2026

Abstract originale

The sense that ourself is continuous over time is a ubiquitous human experience. Although episodic autobiographical memory (AM) makes some contribution to one's subjective sense of self-continuity-also known as I-self continuity or phenomenological continuity-there is growing evidence that individuals with memory disorders report intact phenomenological continuity. These observations suggest that additional processes must also contribute to phenomenological continuity. This systematic search and critical review aimed to identify candidate bodily and psychological processes underlying phenomenological continuity, with a focus on processes beyond AM. A systematic search of three databases (PsycINFO, PubMed and Web of Science) yielded 153 publications that provided evidence of several processes contributing to phenomenological continuity: interoception, embodiment, temporality, a stable life trajectory and nostalgia. Alongside episodic AM, these processes provide multiple sources of constancy integrated across differing timescales. In addition, we identified several processes that indirectly influence the saliency and expression of phenomenological continuity, such as ageing, socio-cultural factors and narrative processes. These findings extend existing models of self-continuity, providing a more comprehensive overview of the processes that, along with memory, underpin phenomenological continuity. This article is part of the discussion meeting issue 'From being to identity: analysis and synthesis of the self'.

Parole chiave

HumansMemory, EpisodicSelf ConceptAgingI-selfautobiographical memoryautonoetic consciousnessbiographical disruptionsepisodic memoryself-continuitysubjective continuitytemporal processingEpisodic memoryTemporal ProcessingAutobiographical MemoryAutonoetic ConsciousnessSelf-continuityI-SelfBiographical DisruptionsSubjective Continuity
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Towards a comprehensive understanding of the processes underlying phenomenological continuity Towards a comprehensive understanding of the processes underlying phenomenological continuity

Abstract

The sense that ourself is continuous over time is a ubiquitous human experience. Although episodic autobiographical memory (AM) makes some contribution to one's subjective sense of self-continuity—also known as I-self continuity or phenomenological continuity—there is growing evidence that individuals with memory disorders report intact phenomenological continuity. These observations suggest that additional processes must also contribute to phenomenological continuity. This systematic search and critical review aimed to identify candidate bodily and psychological processes underlying phenomenological continuity, with a focus on processes beyond AM. A systematic search of three databases (PsycINFO, PubMed and Web of Science) yielded 153 publications that provided evidence of several processes contributing to phenomenological continuity: interoception, embodiment, temporality, a stable life trajectory and nostalgia. Alongside episodic AM, these processes provide multiple sources of constancy integrated across differing timescales. In addition, we identified several processes that indirectly influence the saliency and expression of phenomenological continuity, such as ageing, socio-cultural factors and narrative processes. These findings extend existing models of self-continuity, providing a more comprehensive overview of the processes that, along with memory, underpin phenomenological continuity.

This article is part of the discussion meeting issue ‘From being to identity: analysis and synthesis of the self’.

1.Introduction

The question of how we know and feel that we are the same continuous person over time has been pondered for millennia. Yet the underpinnings of this phenomenon, known as diachronic unity, remain unclear. Previous work has linked diachronic unity to two forms of self-continuity based on William James’ [1] distinction of the I-self or ‘self-as-experiencer’ that actively reflects upon the Me-self or ‘self-as-experienced’ [2–4]. On this view, Me-self continuity, also known as semantic continuity, corresponds to the temporally extended representation of the self, including the self-concept and life story. In contrast, I-self continuity, or phenomenological continuity,1 refers to a moment-to-moment phenomenon of experiencing the self as extended in time that comprises both the ‘warmth and intimacy’ that James ascribes to the pre-reflective I-self [1] as well as the higher-order experiences of self-awareness and self-reflection [3]. Some have viewed this continuous I-self as an inner essence that owns and experiences all of our thoughts, perceptions and feelings (e.g. [12]). These inner states may change from one moment to the next, and the people and places that make up our lives may come and go, yet the ‘experiencer’ persists. Others have instead conceived of phenomenological continuity as arising from the flow of consciousness itself (e.g. [13]). It is the relations and resemblances between the inner experiential states that produce a sense of sameness over time—be these temporal contiguity, causal connections or the fact that all experiences that occur within me are infused with the same ‘warmth and intimacy’ [1] that is unique to me and makes them mine. The question of whether an ‘experiencer’ exists or whether, as the latter view supposes, it is illusory is beyond the scope of this article (see [14] for a recent treatment of this question). The current review focuses on the processes that underpin phenomenological continuity in light of apparently paradoxical findings emerging in the literature.

One influential theory is that phenomenological continuity depends heavily on episodic autobiographical memory (AM) and episodic future thinking [15,16] that enable the conscious (p)re-experience of the self at particular moments in the past and future [3,9]. Characteristic of this type of remembering is autonoetic consciousness that places past, present and future selves on a subjective timeline [17]. As such, a substantial portion of the theoretical and empirical literature on phenomenological continuity has focused on episodic AM as a key underlying mechanism [2,3,7,8,18–24]. At its most extreme, memory loss in amnesic individuals, such as patient H.M., results in a profound sense of the self being stuck in the present rather than extending over time [25,26]. Moreover, other studies report that less severe episodic AM deficits, such as those evident in Alzheimer's disease [27,28] and Asperger syndrome [29], are also associated with some degree of phenomenological discontinuity.

Nevertheless, contradictory evidence is emerging, with findings that people with significant loss of episodic AM, owing to Alzheimer's disease and episodic amnesia following hippocampal damage, are just as likely as healthy controls to report that they feel like they are fundamentally the same person as they were in the past [10,30–33]. If these individuals have a reduced capacity to re-experience their past selves via episodic AM, what then underlies their phenomenological continuity? Residual ‘islands’ of episodic AM may give some of these individuals sufficient linkages to their past selves. However, processes aside from episodic AM likely provide other means for phenomenological continuity.

Aspects of interoception and embodiment that contribute to the pre-reflective I-self in the present moment [6,34–36] also have temporal features that may be important to phenomenological continuity [37–39]. For instance, the ongoing experience of inhabiting the same body [35] or the constancy of bodily signals [40] may be a source of phenomenological continuity even when memory is impaired [2]. Interestingly, individuals with memory loss exhibit preservation of the embodied self, including bodily movements, gestures and habits [35,41–44]. We have recently suggested that the implicit reinstatement of bodily representations, states and experiences may give rise to phenomenological continuity even when memories of these states and experiences cannot be remembered [2]. In contrast, the experience of certain impactful events can create rifts or ‘biographical disruptions’ in the expected course of one's life [7] that may result in phenomenological discontinuity.

The objective of this systematic search and critical review is to assess the theoretical and empirical evidence that these potential processes—and any others that emerge through our search—support phenomenological continuity. It is worth considering the various ways in which phenomenological continuity has been operationalized in empirical research. One set of methods focuses on implicit, unconscious or embodied aspects of phenomenological continuity using qualitative approaches [45–47] or behavioural paradigms [48,49]. Other methods probe the reflective aspects of phenomenological continuity by measuring the perceived similarity of, or psychological connection between, the present self and the self in the past or future (e.g. continuous identity Venn diagram [50,51], self-continuity index [52] and self-continuity interview [53,54]). Neuroimaging (e.g. functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG); [55,56]) and neuropsychological (e.g. [10,29,31,57]) approaches have also been leveraged to shine light on the neural correlates of phenomenological (dis)continuity. Any given measure only taps into one aspect of phenomenological continuity, so only illuminating part of this complex construct. In this systematic search and review, we identified and synthesized findings generated by these different methodologies with available theoretical perspectives with the aim of developing a more comprehensive explanation of phenomenological continuity that accounts for its preservation in the face of significant memory loss.

2.Methods

(a)Inclusion and exclusion criteria

Articles that covered at least one potential process underlying phenomenological continuity2 were considered. To be exhaustive, we included articles irrespective of population, publication date, design or data type. Exclusion criteria were as follows: not examining phenomenological continuity (e.g. present-moment I-self and forms of Me-self continuity); examining phenomenological continuity as underlying another mental process; conference abstracts, commentaries, editorials, book reviews and corrections; and articles where the main text was not in English.

(b)Search strategy

Our search strategy involved two approaches. Our primary method was systematic searches of three databases—PsycINFO, PubMed and Web of Science—conducted on 6 and 7 June 2023. The search query included terms related to self-continuity (table 1); to cast a wide net, these terms captured all forms of self-continuity, including those usually associated with the Me-self (e.g. narrative continuity). A set of excluded terms was used to streamline the results. Our secondary method, pearl-growing using citations from the database results and PubMed alerts, identified additional papers published online up until 4 September 2024.3Table 1.Search terms and Boolean operators used for literature database searches. Boolean operators are in capital case; asterisk indicates wildcard.

terms related to self-continuity NOT terms related to other (excluded) self-related constructs

‘phenomenological continuity’ OR ‘subjective continuity’ OR ‘self-continuity’ OR ‘semantic continuity’ OR ‘narrative continuity’ OR ‘temporal continuity’ OR ‘diachronic unity’ self-report* OR self-assess* OR self-evaluat* OR self-injur* OR self-disgust or self-administrat* OR self-manage* OR self-regulat* OR self-esteem OR self-control OR self-understanding OR self-disclosure OR self-interest OR self-limit* OR self-replicat* OR self-complement* OR self-adjuvant* OR self-rat* OR self-assembl* OR self-organi* OR self-select* OR self-sampl* OR self-associat*

(c)Article selection

As presented in the PRISMA diagram (figure 1), the systematic searches yielded 2025 records that were submitted to two levels of screening by O.M.D. with input from D.R.A. and L.J.T. First-level screening focused on titles and abstracts; duplicate results were removed, and inclusion/exclusion criteria applied. Second-level screening was of full texts; if available in English, these were read and exclusion criteria applied as necessary. Included papers were then categorized according to publication type and the candidate process(es) covered. Publication lists from each screening step are publicly available (https://osf.io/qz8bm).

3.Results

Our systematic search yielded 153 publications between 1987 and 2025 that cover six processes that potentially contribute to phenomenological continuity: AM (n = 45), interoception (n = 13), embodiment (n = 41), temporality (n = 17), life trajectory stability (n = 56) and nostalgia (n = 25; figure 2; for a list of papers in each category, see supplemental material, table S1). As the current focus was on identifying non-mnemonic processes underlying phenomenological continuity, we restricted our synthesis to all identified processes except episodic AM. Note that not all 153 papers are cited below; the full list of references is available in section S2 in the supplemental material.

(a)Interoception

A small set of 13 papers, mostly theoretical, described how interoception—the perception of internal stimuli, such as heart rate, pain and affective states—could play an important role in phenomenological continuity at the level of physiological systems. Available evidence from electrophysiological, neuroimaging and lesion studies suggest that the insula integrates interoceptive signals not only in a particular moment but across an extended period of time surrounding that moment [38,39] and integrates this representation with other self-relevant information [55]. In these accounts, the temporal extension of interoceptive feelings is on the order of (sub-)seconds, which, some argue, may be too short to underpin phenomenological continuity [28,58]. Nevertheless, we surmise that this extension of the I-self into the very near past and future may set a vital foundation for phenomenological continuity across longer timescales.

Indeed, visceral monitoring occurs not only over short timescales (e.g. heartbeat) but also over longer ones (e.g. digestion). Multiple review papers examining the role of the body in phenomenological continuity have proposed that integrating interoceptive information across several timescales may, in itself, be a source of phenomenological continuity [35,59,60], possibly at an implicit, unconscious level. Additionally, with their relative invariance and continuously cyclic nature that occur within their own nested time cycle [61], visceral and bodily signals often appear relatively static to the experiencer, providing a bodily constancy that can persist not only across days or years but even across one's lifetime [35,60]. The regulation of bodily systems through change (i.e. interoceptive active inference) results in a strong subjective expectation of bodily stability that may contribute to ‘change-blindness’ for the self [62]. It is possible that apparent stability of one's internal milieu over long timescales could be fundamental to phenomenological continuity. These authors also draw on reports from studies that observed that the present-moment I-self is altered with insula dysfunction and other conditions affecting interoception (e.g. [63–66]) to speculate that interoceptive deficits may affect phenomenological continuity [27,67]. However, our search did not reveal any studies testing this hypothesis directly, and this would be a fruitful avenue for future research.

(b)Embodiment

Forty-one results referred to the idea that the existence of the lived body across one's life plays a pivotal role in phenomenological continuity ([35,59], but see [23]). One aspect of embodiment is the sense of agency or perceived control over one's body. Agency depends on the dynamic integration of experience over time, which has been hypothesized to occur in conjunction with a precise timing system—albeit also on the order of (sub-)seconds—making this another candidate process we found was theorized to support phenomenological continuity. Specifically, a combination of empirical evidence and theoretical work shows incoming multisensory signals, such as actions and thoughts, are compared with expectations of future signals derived from prior experience via predictive coding mechanisms; when these signals match, an experience is identified as qualitatively mine [48] and in turn belonging to the I-self [61].

Much of the literature linking embodiment to phenomenological continuity focuses on implicit forms of body memory that encapsulate all bodily constancies, including habits, physical capabilities and the entire history of the body's lived experience [35,59]. For instance, many authors contend that habits can stabilize the I-self over time, given their slow-changing nature and repetition across many contexts and time points [2,7,20,29,35,68]. A couple of qualitative studies suggested that habits result in the recall of meaningful sensations (e.g. baking cookies and lighting candles) and so could also act as vehicles for phenomenological continuity [69,70].

Another form of body memory, Rilkean memories, represents pre-reflective bodily-based actions and dispositions that accompany movements and experiences. It has been theorized that Rilkean memories are stored within the body independently from other kinds of memory, including episodic and procedural memories of the experience [35,71]. For example, a qualitative study that examined the lived experiences of people living with dementia provides evidence that access to embodied memory in the form of re-enacting bodily-oriented activities likely enables a pre-reflective form of phenomenological continuity that is not dependent on episodic memory [72]. An interesting claim, based on an interpretation of the work by Winnicott, an influential British psychoanalyst, is that very early experiences, such as movement in utero, may provide essential precursors to the development of a temporally extended I-self [73]. Furthermore, at a more explicit level, an anthropological study observed that individuals recovering from eating disorders appear to leverage memories of bodily states and somatic practices as a way to bridge the gap between their temporally distant I-selves, thereby integrating the lived experiences of one's past disorder and present recovery [45].

A number of papers linked phenomenological continuity with the updating of one's body representation. Although some researchers are beginning to consider the role of pre-experiencing one's future body—either via imagination or age-morphing technology [49,74–76]—most focus on responses to physical changes (e.g. [46,77]). For example, a case study of a woman with a sternotomy scar following open-heart surgery observed that she initially experienced diminished phenomenological continuity, manifesting as a sense of defamiliarization and not ‘being-at-home’ within her body. However, her sense of phenomenological continuity was restored through the integration of her scar within her embodied representation via affective touch and meaning-making [46]. The perceived effect of changes to body representation on phenomenological continuity can vary. A review paper drawing on published case reports of individuals with deep brain stimulators explains that, following implantation, some people report restorative effects on phenomenological continuity, whereas others describe detrimental effects. The authors argue that these differences reflect how well these individuals have integrated the neurostimulation device into their body representation [78]. Another study with a group of stroke survivors found many exhibited a high degree of phenomenological continuity, suggesting that experiencing embodied physical changes does not inevitably result in a sense of being fundamentally different [79].

Yet, the disruption of other forms of embodiment may be enough to produce a diminished sense of phenomenological continuity. Multiple review papers [80–84] and an empirical study [85] suggest that psychotic and dissociative symptoms experienced in schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and dissociative identity disorder profoundly alter many aspects of embodiment, including agency, body ownership and lived experience, resulting in a fragmented, unstable and weakened sense of phenomenological continuity. Findings regarding whether temporary alterations of embodied experience, such as during meditation, can result in fluctuations of phenomenological continuity are mixed. Two studies found that meditation affects the continuity of the I-self [56,58], possibly because the combination of heightened bodily attention, a perceived cessation of time and changes in physiological activity reduces the salience of the boundary between self and non-self. In contrast, a third study reported no association between trait mindfulness and phenomenological continuity [86]. The mixed findings presented by these studies suggest that changes to one's body representation can, in many cases, be eventually integrated into one's I-self without permanently disrupting phenomenological continuity. However, the health conditions examined in this literature vary in terms of the severity and the specific aspects of embodiment impacted, likely accounting for some of the variability observed in how such changes influence phenomenological continuity across conditions.

(c)Temporality

Seventeen papers addressed the role of what we refer to collectively as temporality in phenomenological continuity, including inner time processing, the perceived passage of time and one's orientation in subjective time (i.e. towards the past versus future). A number of theories focus on temporal properties of brain signals as providing a means for self-related information—including experiential aspects—to be propagated across time. For instance, Revach and Salti [87] propose that predictive coding mechanisms prioritize the regularities of experience at the expense of fluctuations or deviations. Through the continuity of experience, a history of thoughts, feelings and perceptions accumulates in coarse-grained representations that smooth the transitions between states over time. They link this neural integration between discrete moments of time to phenomenological continuity. In a recent paper [2], we make a similar proposal that the history dependence of neural signals in the default mode network enables the integration of overlapping trajectories of both slow- and fast-changing experiences (see ‘Discussion’ for a more detailed discussion, including a related theory from Northoff and colleagues [11,88,89]). Fuchs [35,82] also advances a neuro-phenomenological account that applies philosophical arguments from Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to understanding the effect of psychopathology on phenomenological continuity. Fuchs and colleagues propose that the processing of time operates on two interrelated levels: an implicit, pre-reflective flow of lived time and an explicit, reflective awareness of temporal succession. According to this neuro-phenomenological account, there are two prerequisites for implicit time processing, both of which relate to the I-self: (i) the constitutive synthesis of inner experience, referring to the combination of one's sense of what is to come next, what is occurring in a particular moment and what has just immediately happened—corresponding to Husserl's concepts of protentions, presentations and retentions; and (ii) conation-affective dynamics, encompassing the basic energetic or motivational states, such as drives and urges that imbue one's subjective experiences with a ‘sense of aliveness’ [82]. Relatedly, converging neuroscientific evidence suggests that the temporal overlap of different aspects of one's experience gives rise to a sense of continuous subjective experience, and this may be supported by the temporal properties of brain activity [2]. Moreover, extraction of regularities in information related to the I-self across time can be modelled and organized into hierarchical systems that give rise to both phenomenological and semantic forms of continuity [87].

Several review articles linked abnormal temporal processing to disruptions of phenomenological continuity in psychiatric conditions, including depression [59,80,82], bipolar disorder [59,81,82], borderline personality disorder [81] and schizophrenia [57,80,82,90], albeit with some differences between conditions. For example, depression is often associated with a subjective slowing or cessation of time, thought to be related to feeling as if one is stuck in the present yet preoccupied with the past [80] or to a form of hyper-embodiment in which one feels stuck within the confines of their own body and isolated from the passing experiences of the external world [59,82]. People with bipolar disorder report experiencing time as slowing down during depressive episodes, but as speeding up during manic episodes [59,81,82], whereas people with borderline personality tend to experience time as fragmented, rapidly switching from one present to the next [81]. These authors have argued that these alterations of temporality are the source of reduced phenomenological continuity in mood disorders. Schizophrenia, on the other hand, is marked by a global disconnect between the immediate past, present and anticipated future that Fuchs has proposed could be owing to impairments in both the constitutive synthesis of inner experience and conation-affective dynamics aspects of implicit time processing [59,82].

Age-related differences in time perception may help explain empirical findings that, relative to younger adults, older adults generally exhibit a stronger sense of phenomenological continuity [91–94]. One explanation is that older adults typically perceive time as passing more quickly, leading to a compressed sense of time that may be experienced as an ‘extended present’. This temporal compression reduces the perceived distance between past, present and future selves [91,92], thus heightening phenomenological continuity. Cross-cultural differences in phenomenological continuity may also relate to temporality. For instance, Ji et al. [91,95] found that relative to Westerners who tend to be present-focused, East Asian participants showed stronger connections to both the past and future that were associated with stronger phenomenological continuity—perhaps again via a compression of perceived distances on one's subjective timeline (but see [96]). Further, other studies have found that Eastern cultures place more value on past events and traditions, whereas Western cultures are more future-focused and emphasize progress—and phenomenological continuity mirrors this pattern, with Westerners showing greater future asymmetry (i.e. higher future continuity relative to past continuity) than individuals from Eastern cultures [97].

(d)Stability of life trajectory

A stable life trajectory shapes and informs the lived experience of the I-self over time [7,20], and events that drastically change this trajectory were identified as detrimental to phenomenological continuity in 56 papers, which included many empirical studies and a few reviews about the effects of biographical disruptions on phenomenological continuity. Diagnosis of a health condition, from dementia to depression [30,98], is a common biographical disruption that can throw into disarray the life one had envisaged for oneself, either through unexpected challenges, the support needed from others, loss of employment or changes in one's goals. Transitions, such as adolescence, socio-cultural upheaval (e.g. the First Nations self-determination movement [53,99,100]) and global events (e.g. the COVID-19 pandemic [101,102]), have been found to have similar effects. Other examples include existential anxiety [103], stressors associated with belonging to a minority group (e.g. discrimination [104]) and significant life events such as relationships ending or changes in occupations [7,8,20,52,105]. When these events constitute biographical disruptions, individuals report perceiving a sense of derailment: a subjective feeling at the level of the I-self that one's life is on an unexpected or ‘off-course’ trajectory [98].

Particular biographical disruptions may also impact the stability of other processes underpinning phenomenological continuity, such as embodiment [7,20]. For instance, the development of a child within the mother's body during pregnancy produces a unique intercorporeal relationship that temporarily fuses one's I-self with another being—an alteration to the mother's body representation that is soon reversed by childbirth, as observed in a qualitative study that interviewed mothers who gave birth prematurely [47]. Life changes can also disrupt the embodied sense of ‘being at home’ in particular places, that is the qualitative feeling of familiarity with spaces and cultures that are experienced as one's ‘own’ [106]. A number of articles, both primary studies and reviews, suggested that profound changes in sense of place, whether provoked by migration or displacement ([106–114]; but see [115]) or transitioning from deployment to civilian life [116], may especially threaten phenomenological continuity. Our sense of being at home initially develops through secure attachments to our carers in early life and, in turn, influences the development of the I-self over time [111]. We surmise that the sense of ‘homelessness’ is one reason why biographical disruptions and adversity occurring in childhood can be particularly detrimental for phenomenological continuity [105,117].

There are several ways in which phenomenological continuity can be maintained or restored when one's life trajectory is disrupted. One is through the incorporation of changes as part of one's I-self, which the dialogical approach [118] provides a framework for understanding. On this account, the I-self takes different forms or ‘I-positions’ across different spaces, social interactions and therefore across time (e.g. ‘I-as-my body’ and ‘I-as-mother’). As Salgado et al. [118] argue, ‘at every moment, every person occupies a contextualized ‘position’ regarding the world … the self develops as a chain of positions that succeed each other in time’ (pp. 327–328). Although instability is inherent to this ‘micro’ level as I-positions change from moment to moment, these can be integrated as manifestations of the same I-self by tracing sequences of I-positions [118]. Further unification is thought to occur through self-related dialogue, such as internal thoughts or social conversations that invite self-reflection (e.g. psychotherapy), by which individuals relate I-positions to each other over longer time spans, identify repetitions of and similarities across I-positions and develop meta-I-positions that afford high-level perspectives on the entire life course [118]. Two recent studies provide evidence that during migration [107] and the transition to motherhood [47], the emergence of meta-positions enabled individuals to reconcile and incorporate changes to the I-self and ultimately maintain or even enhance their sense of phenomenological continuity. Moreover, while some aspects of the I-self may be experienced as ‘off-course’ during a biographical disruption, others remain on a continuous life trajectory. Additionally, continued interactions with meaningful activities, people and possessions [29,107,117,119]—including culturally shared practices, symbols and traditions [53,120–122]—may counteract threats to phenomenological continuity. For instance, a study on hoarding reported that individuals with Asperger syndrome use their collection of objects as a form of external scaffolding to counteract the negative impacts of AM deficits on their phenomenological continuity [29].

Threats to phenomenological continuity can also be mitigated through the endorsement of beliefs and explanations about self-continuity, such as understanding ourselves as beings who are capable of change [113], and that, despite changes, we remain fundamentally the same at our core [53,99,120,123]. Change can also be framed as one arc within the broader life story. Although these narrative processes are integral to the Me-self, empirical studies have found that individuals can help repair the discontinuity experienced in the I-self by actively integrating change [7,108].

Culture and age shape how individuals maintain phenomenological continuity in the face of biographical disruptions. Studies show explanatory strategies and beliefs about self-continuity differ across cultures [53,124,125], which we surmise may be called upon to varying extents depending on socio-cultural background and lived experience. Moreover, age may bring greater capacity to navigate biographical disruptions. Indeed, despite the challenges to sense of self that accompany ageing, including the loss of independent living, the death of loved ones and declines in the bodily self, several studies report evidence that phenomenological continuity is stronger with older age [76,92,105,119].

(e)Nostalgia

The role of nostalgia in phenomenological continuity emerged in 25 papers. Nostalgia is an ambivalent affective state combining yearning, wistfulness and bittersweetness with a positivity for people or places from ‘times gone by’ [126]. Although fundamentally self-relevant, nostalgia is also social, typically experienced by people reminiscing, and cultural, with rituals or traditions often the focus of this yearning [70,112]. While reminiscing can trigger AM recall of specific events and lifetime periods, nostalgia is a distinct process characterized by its emotional and social nature. Most studies report a positive relationship between nostalgia and phenomenological continuity [19,127,128], evident regardless of culture [102,126].

Nostalgia involves making links between one's past, present and even future, resulting in a broader outlook on life that emphasizes commonalities, which, in turn, could allow one to view one's self as connected over time at an experiential, subjective level [129]. Additionally, nostalgizing provides affective connections between the present and temporally distant selves. A similar relationship has been reported between phenomenological continuity and awe [130], suggesting affective experiences that reach over time, rather than nostalgia itself, may afford a source of phenomenological continuity. Both nostalgia and awe likely evoke autonoetic consciousness, enabling a person to remember what it felt like to be oneself in the past, without necessarily recalling specific episodic details. An alternative view is that the relationship between nostalgia and phenomenological continuity is mediated by other factors, including social connectedness and belongingness [126,128], ostracism (i.e. the opposite of social connectedness [131]), narrative processes [132,133] and holistic thinking [129].

4.Discussion

The emergence of evidence that people with severe episodic AM impairments still report a fundamental feeling of being the same person over time (e.g. [10,30,31]) requires that models of phenomenological continuity extend beyond AM. In line with our hypotheses, the results identified contributions of bodily-oriented and psychological processes, specifically interoception, embodiment, temporality, stability of one's life trajectory and nostalgia. Although some of these processes—namely embodiment, life trajectory stability and nostalgia—draw on memory to some extent, these forms of memory are distinct from episodic AM. The set of processes identified here, taken in conjunction with episodic AM, provides a more complete mechanistic explanation of phenomenological continuity and allows for a level of redundancy so that only in the most extreme of cases is phenomenological continuity lost. These findings indicate that our original model that focused on AM [2,3] should be updated to incorporate this broader range of processes underpinning phenomenological continuity.

(a)Sources of constancy and reconciliation of change

Each of the identified processes offers self-stability and constancy, instrumental in the development and maintenance of phenomenological continuity. Interoception, for example, incorporates visceral and bodily signals, continuously cyclical and relatively invariant, which provide stability across long timescales from days to one's entire lifetime [35,60]. Similarly, the storage and reinstatement of many forms of embodied memories, including Rilkean memories and habits, provide a profound sense of inhabiting the same body over time (e.g. [35]). Whether or not particular types of embodied memories—such as those frequently accessed (e.g. habits) or those more central to the I-self—have a privileged role in phenomenological continuity is unclear. One's sense of place, or ‘being at home’ [106,110], as well as continuity of interpersonal relationships, may be elements of ‘the thread of a lived life’ [14, p. 95] that maintains phenomenological continuity in times of biographical disruptions.

Embodiment is intertwined with interoception, consistent with arguments that the two processes evolved alongside each other [134]; interoceptive states are experienced by, and emerge in response to, a body that is engaging with the world with a sense of agentic control. However, in line with influential frameworks of pre-reflective self, the internal milieu also includes perceptions, actions, thoughts, and other cognitions and feelings [135–137], with researchers such as Damasio [135], Panksepp [136] and Asma and Gabriel [137] emphasizing emotion and affect as particularly central. We found that the recurrence of these feeling states across time, via both interoception [38,39] and nostalgia [112,126,128], provides another important source of constancy. Relatedly, many authors [17], including ourselves [3], have argued that (p)re-experiencing these feeling states as extended over time at a reflective level is uniquely underpinned by episodic AM and future thinking. Our findings dovetail with an emerging perspective that these autonoetic states can be mediated by non-episodic forms of AM [138] and by non-mnemonic mechanisms such as embodiment and interoception [139].

Some mechanisms can account for change. Despite being in constant flux, the ongoing regulation of physiological systems gives a somewhat illusory perception of relative stasis—a form of self-change-blindness [62], with predictive coding for future bodily and feeling states playing a major role in this illusion [38,139]. Conversely, recognizing changes in the I-self can also foster phenomenological continuity by prompting comparison across two points of time. Thus, both ignoring and attending to change can inform phenomenological continuity, albeit in different ways. Additionally, changes in the I-self may initiate adaptation that provides its own source of continuity, such as updating one's body representation [46] or I-positions [107,118]. Fluctuations in the I-self can also be regulated through the capacity for taking meta-perspectives on the commonalities of one's I-self across time and space [47,118] or the extraction of regularities in self-experience that are then propagated across time [87,139].

Perhaps unsurprisingly, temporality emerged as critical to understanding the continuity of the I-self over time. As put by Tafarodi, ‘We cannot apprehend ourselves outside of time … temporality is inherent to being’ [140, p. 33]. Although as Prescott & Dominey [139] remind us, continuity does not require a calibrated mechanism for measuring time; all that is needed is the ability to distinguish between now and then. Interestingly, some theories actually posit a central role of interoception in how time is registered in the brain, stemming from evidence that the anterior insula cortex houses ‘an endogenous time base’ [38, p. 1932]. In particular, Wittman [141] proposes that successions of bodily signals are stored as pulses in the insula that accumulate when attention is directed to time, which informs duration judgements and, in turn, forms the basis of subjective time. For most, if not all, of the processes examined here, continuity is afforded by some form of recurrence or temporal integration, so it is interesting to note that many of them exist at multiple timescales. Interoception, for example, exists both on the order of seconds [38,39] and longer timescales, ranging from hours, days, to one's entire lifetime [35,60]. Conation-affective dynamics (e.g. motivational states such as urges and drives) also lie at the intersection of interoception and temporality [82]. Furthermore, embodied memories can reference momentary bodily experiences but arguably also capture the body's lived history from birth until death [35,59].

Taken together, many of the mechanisms we have identified in this review as underpinning phenomenological continuity span across or occur at differing timescales. We speculate that the intersection of these timescales could be a key mechanism for phenomenological continuity [2]. According to the principles of hierarchical integration (e.g. [142,143]), transient forms of continuity operating below the level of awareness (e.g. agency) are nested within consciously accessible continuity signals, and rapid fluctuations of experience are incorporated with both persisting signals and gradual changes. Neuroimaging evidence suggests that brain regions are organized according to the timescales of the signals they process [142,144], and that the temporal structure of brain signals may underpin aspects of the I-self, including its continuity [37,145]. Indeed, a number of studies conducted by Northoff and colleagues provide compelling evidence of a relationship between self-related processing and the particular temporal properties of neural activity in the default mode network (for comprehensive reviews and discussion of their spatiotemporal neuroscience framework, see [11,88,89]). Their findings suggest that continuity is associated with the long autocorrelation window of activity in these brain regions that arguably reflects the neural recurrence or temporal ‘expansion’ of self-relevant information over time [145], akin to the brain's ‘memory’ for its processing history. Moreover, the temporal structure of these brain regions is scale-free, with patterns echoing across infra-slow to fast timescales [11]. Northoff's framework is a ‘basis model’ of the self in that it posits that this multiscale integration is a fundamental property of the brain that underpins even pre-reflective aspects of self and is therefore independent of perception, cognition and affect [146]. The findings of the critical review, as interpreted here, complement this basis model by elucidating similarly structured temporal dynamics in both pre-reflective and reflective forms of continuity, with both bodily signals and higher-order self-reflective thoughts repeating across multiple timescales.

(b)Modulators of phenomenological continuity

The results of this critical review also revealed processes that shape the saliency and expression of phenomenological continuity. A particularly noteworthy finding was that despite reductions in episodic AM, older adults report stronger phenomenological continuity than younger adults. Although linked to alterations in temporality, such as a compressed sense of time [91,92], we suggest that age-related asymmetries in the amount of life yet-to-be or already lived may also modulate other processes underpinning phenomenological continuity. With a greater accumulation of lived experience and more opportunities for the recurrence of interoceptive states and habits over much longer time expanses, older adults should necessarily have stronger self-continuity signals with their past selves than younger adults. In contrast, although younger adults can experience phenomenological continuity over long expanses with their future selves, by definition, this self-continuity is not based on lived experience, and therefore, the quality—or at least strength—of future phenomenological continuity likely differs from older adults. Additionally, psychosocial maturation likely alters the salience of one's phenomenological continuity. The focus during younger adulthood on goal-pursuit, new roles and identities, and personal growth [147] may de-emphasize phenomenological continuity. In contrast, goal orientation shifts towards maintenance and stability [147], which likely enhances phenomenological continuity. Further, the increasing need to reflect on, and make sense of, one's life trajectory takes prominence in later life [148], which has been related to age-related increases in nostalgia [149].

Culture also shapes the way we perceive our phenomenological continuity [140]. Cultural heritage, including long-standing traditions, customs and extended family histories, provides a form of continuity operating on a timescale beyond one's own lifetime that may heighten one's own perceived phenomenological continuity. Additionally, culture can provide resilience in the face of personal challenges [53] and when threatened or destabilized by colonization or migration, there is usually a striving to protect the group's continuity [150]. Cultural retention is not always possible, however; in such cases, individual members may be more vulnerable to phenomenological discontinuity and poorer psychological outcomes [120,123]. There are cross-cultural differences in how time is perceived and subjectively experienced [140], and we suggest, as have others (e.g. [140]), that phenomenological continuity is shaped by culturally shared conceptions of time. Other cultural frames, such as norms of personhood and ‘life scripts’ of what a typical life should look like, also influence phenomenological continuity. For instance, in Western culture, there is an implicit theory of development—that we grow from experience and that events can change us [151]. Even so, there is also a shared cultural understanding that when someone claims to be a ‘new’ or ‘changed’ person, they are speaking metaphorically. In fact, it is considered abnormal or a crisis of identity for someone to fundamentally feel like they are no longer the same person [84]. Schechtman [14] observes that when someone does become a wholly different person owing to extreme experiences of trauma or neurological conditions that markedly alter personality, both the changed person and those around them are disconcerted or even frightened, in large part because of the strong-held belief that a person should be the same self over time.

Narrative processes, such as autobiographical reasoning used to construct a coherent life story, might also be an important modulator. Although narrative forms of continuity are typically considered distinct from phenomenological continuity in that they rely on the content of the Me-self, the possibility of interactions between semantic or narrative forms of continuity and phenomenological continuity has been raised in the literature [7,20], particularly in the context of biographical disruptions. Narrative processes can be used to link distant elements of one's life with the current I-self in ways that bridge discontinuity. When disruptions and changes are actively embedded within the overarching structure of the life story, this compensation can re-enable phenomenological continuity [7]. Narrative processes can support and augment the gradual integration of bodily changes within one's self-representation to maintain phenomenological continuity following a health condition (e.g. [46]). We propose that in some cases the integration of physiological changes may need to be accompanied by narrative work to fully restore phenomenological continuity. This point is illustrated by the case of a woman where restoration of her phenomenological continuity following sternotomy surgery required meaning-making to fully integrate her scar within her embodied representation [46]. Furthermore, one's subjective outlook is central to narrating one's life story; the I-self is the narrator of the life story, actively processing life experiences, gaining insights and making meaning [152,153]. At any moment, the experience of the I-self is understood through the lens of our current ‘working’ narrative of the self; in this way, narratives are a form of predictive processing that serves to organize patterns of experience and reduce uncertainty that are integral to phenomenological continuity [139].

(c)Phenomenological discontinuity

An important question is whether our I-self can ever truly be discontinuous. Some argue discontinuity is inconceivable; the experiencer is fundamental to having experience [33,115]. By this view, diachronic disunity must arise from changes to the Me-self. An alternative view is that the convergence of the multiple processes identified in this review (and perhaps others we have not identified) provides a redundancy that keeps phenomenological continuity ever-present. All of these processes likely have to be absent in order not to experience any phenomenological continuity at all.

However, phenomenological continuity may exist on a gradient in which perceived self-continuity is a matter of degree [78]. The diminishment of certain processes may have greater effects on phenomenological continuity than others. Although future research is required to clarify how each process differentially contributes to phenomenological continuity, we speculate that pre-reflective bodily-oriented processes in particular, such as interoception and embodiment, play a particularly fundamental role—not only in maintaining phenomenological continuity but also in its earliest development (e.g. in utero, [62,73]). Studies involving populations with impairments in the identified processes could further clarify whether disturbances of certain (or combinations of) processes are more detrimental for phenomenological continuity. It is also possible that the qualitative nature of phenomenological continuity could differ depending on which processes are being leveraged. For example, individuals with episodic AM deficits may demonstrate a different ‘flavour’ of phenomenological continuity than individuals with intact AM. Additionally, while the modulators may explain group differences, there may also be individual differences in the processes not captured by the results. Why is it that not everyone who experiences disturbances in the identified processes feels a sense of phenomenological discontinuity, at least for some period of time? Although there could be additional complex factors at play, from early life experiences to well-being, the threshold of perceiving discontinuity at the level of the I-self may vary across individuals.

(d)Heterogeneity of articles

A key strength—but also a challenge—of this review was its interdisciplinary scope, integrating philosophical and theoretical approaches with empirical evidence from a variety of methods tapping both pre-reflective and reflective aspects of phenomenological continuity. Despite this, the results coalesced around the six identified processes, and there was a strong convergence across sources in how these processes are thought to support phenomenological continuity. One reason for this could be because of many of the empirical and theoretical frameworks being influenced by and grounded in key philosophical arguments. Nevertheless, as we have commented previously [3], the proliferation of self-related nomenclature within and across these literatures remains a challenge. Notably, many empirical studies do not theoretically situate their methods for measuring continuity, with it not always readily apparent whether they are probing pre-reflective or reflective aspects of phenomenological continuity—or whether they are even examining continuity or the I-self at all. The field would be strengthened by work to better map both existing and new measures to theories of continuity.

5.Conclusion

To our knowledge, this review is the first to systematically identify and synthesize the range of processes underlying phenomenological continuity. The results revealed that, alongside AM, multiple processes, including interoception, embodiment, temporality, a stable life trajectory and nostalgia, provide various sources of constancy at both short and long timescales. We suggest that the hierarchical integration of both pre-reflective and reflective experience across differing timescales could be key to phenomenological continuity, and that the reliance on multiple processes may augment continuity as well as protect against discontinuity. We hope that this more comprehensive explanation of phenomenological continuity will be a useful foundation for future empirical research into how it is we perceive ourselves as continuous over time.

Supplementary Material

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Davis OM, Tippett LJ, Addis DR. (2026). Towards a comprehensive understanding of the processes underlying phenomenological continuity.. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences. DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2025.0162

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